Abstract：

 In view of the difficulties in project implementation and promotion caused by multiple stakeholders and complex interest coordination in industrial waste heat heating projects, this paper constructs a non-cooperative game model involving three parties—process industrial enterprises, thermal power plants, and heating companies in industrial waste heat heating. It quantitatively analyses the interaction between technical parameters and market mechanisms in industrial waste heat heating, and proposes optimal pricing strategies and interest coordination mechanisms for each party. Based on the differences in waste heat quality, three sustainable operation modes for industrial waste heat heating are established: the direct heating mode, the collaborative supplementary heating mode, and the enhanced supplementary heating mode. Among them, the direct heating mode involves direct heating without supplementary heat, where the equipment system and operation and maintenance management are the simplest. The collaborative supplementary heating mode involves heating after supplementary heat, with the heating company bearing the reheating costs, representing an effective strategy that balances waste heat recovery and coordinates the interests of multiple parties. The enhanced supplementary heating mode also involves heating after supplementary heat, but requires multiple parties to share the reheating costs and is supported by certain financial subsidy policies. The case analysis results reveal that different cost-sharing methods under the three modes affect the interests and participation enthusiasm of each party. This paper provides a practical and operable decision-making framework for enterprise decision-making and government policy design in industrial waste heat heating projects.

Keywords:heating; industrial waste heat; waste heat utilization; game theory; heating market; pricing mechanism; operation mode